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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
Case No. 920558-CA
DONALD HYLAND KEITZ,
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA IS AN APPROPRIATE
PROCEDURE TO REVIEW THE DENIAL OF A
PRETRIAL ENTRAPMENT MOTION.
Appellee argues that it is inappropriate to enter a conditional guilty plea and
appeal a pretrial ruling of an entrapment motion. The basis for appellee's position is
the contention that entrapment is a substantive defense subject to a jury's
determination. A close reading of the entrapment statute and interpretive case law
lead to the conclusion that the procedure employed by appellee was appropriate.
The critical aspects of the entrapment statute with respect to this issue are
found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) and (5K1953 as amended). Those portions
of the statute provide:
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court
shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a

1

matter of fact and law whether the defendant was
entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall
be made at least ten days before trial except the court for
good cause shown may permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant
was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but
if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped,
such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury
at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based on
entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
Entrapment differs from other substantive defenses in that the Utah statute mandates
that a written motion be filed prior to trial and that the court determine as "... as a
matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped...". None of the other
defenses to criminal responsibility1 or justifications excluding criminal responsibility2
require such a pretrial determination. The other important aspect of the statute is that
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(5) (1953 as amended) does not mandate that the
entrapment issue be presented to the jury should the trial court deny the pretrial
motion.
Appellee describes this initial pretrial determination of the entrapment issue as
a "gate keeping function."3 That is not what Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1953
as amended) requires.

That statue requires that the trial court make the initial

determination of an entrapment issue as a matter of fact and law. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Utah has cautioned trial courts against abdicating their roles in the

1

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-301 et. seq. (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401 et. sea. (1953 as amended).

3

Brief of appellee at p. 17.
2

pretrial decision making process when a jury will make a similar determination at trial.
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778-779 (Utah 1991).
The pre-trial determination that is to be made with respect to entrapment is
very similar to issues relating to the admissibility of evidence.

That decision is

whether the actions of law enforcement agents bar further prosecution of a criminal
defendant. The mere fact that the same issue may be presented to a jury should not
preclude the entry of a conditional plea and an appellate review of the pretrial ruling.
Appellee cites State v. Udell. 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986), and State v. Salmon, 612
P.2d 366 (Utah 1980), for the proposition that the initial denial of an entrapment
motion is "... a provisional assessment that the question should be resolved at trial."4
In both Udell and Salmon the issue that was raised on appeal was whether the
conduct of law enforcement officers constituted entrapment as a matter of law. In
both of those cases the court ruled that there was no entrapment as a matter of law.
The court then went on to state in those cases it was proper to present the
entrapment issue to the jury. Neither of those cases go so far as to require that the
entrapment issue be presented to a jury if the pretrial motion is denied.
Appellee argues that State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), allows
the entry of a conditional plea and taking of an appeal only as to issues relating to the
admissibility of evidence. A number of the policies that justify such a procedure and
the authorities that permit similar procedures are not so limited. The primary policy
reason for allowing the procedure in Sery was judicial economy. The procedure that

4

Brief of appellee at 14.
3

was allowed in Sery saved the time and expense of a trial when the critical legal issue
related to the admissibility of the evidence to be introduced at that trial. The court
had no problems with a procedure that allowed a defendant to admit guilt, then
claim on appeal that the government is barred from being able to prove its case due
to an illegal search.
One of the authorities cited by the court in Serv for allowing that procedure
was Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 The federal rule
allows for a conditional guilty plea that reserves the right to review "any specified
pretrial motion." The federal procedures do not provide for a pretrial entrapment
determination.

However, the federal rule has not been limited to the review of

evidentiary suppression issues.6 A pretrial ruling such as that required by the Utah
entrapment statute would certainly be subject to appellate review under the federal
rule. The substance of an entrapment determination is whether the government is
barred from convicting an individual based on the misconduct of its agents. The

5

F.R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) provides:
Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the
consent of the government, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in
writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of
the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.
A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to
withdraw the plea.

6

United States v. Yasak, 884 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1989) (Review of motion to
dismiss information); United States v. Ballester. 763 F.2d 368 (9th Cir) cert, denied
474 U.S. 842 (1985) (Review of motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial
misconduct.)
4

policy of allowing an appeal of the entrapment issue also provides for judicial economy
by allowing the review of the legal issue without a trial.
Appellee contends that procedurally when a criminal defendant pleads guilty he
is conceding the absence of entrapment. It is then claimed that a defendant should
not than be able to claim on appeal that he was entrapped into committing the
offense. In making this argument appellee disregards the unique procedures required
to raise entrapment in Utah. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1953 as amended)
mandates a pretrial legal and factual determination of the entrapment issue.

If

entrapment could be raised only as a trial defense then appellee's argument may have
merit. Furthermore, when a criminal defendant claims entrapment, there is generally
a concession of one's guilt to the charged offense.

Consequently, there is no

inconsistency in pleading guilty and admitting the commission of a criminal offense
and allowing the review of a claim of entrapment.
Finally, appellee claims that the use of a conditional plea to review a pretrial
entrapment ruling would violate the separation of powers requirement of the Utah
Constitution.7 In making this argument appellee contends that the Utah legislature
has determined of how entrapment questions may reach the appellate courts.8 This
argument is based on a misconstruction of the entrapment statute. That statute does
not require that there be a jury determination of entrapment before that issue may be
reviewed on appeal. In fact the opposite is true. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4)

7

Utah Constitution Article V. Section 1.

8

Brief of appellee at p. 15.
5

(1953 as amended) mandates a pretrial determination of the entrapment issue. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (1953 as amended) is permissive on whether the entrapment
issue be presented to the jury. That provision would allow a defendant to raise the
entrapment issue prior to trial, not use it as a defense at trial, then raise it as an issue
to be reviewed on appeal. Consequently, there is no separation of powers problem
involved in the procedure employed in the instant case.

This is because an

entrapment issue may be raised on appeal even though it was not presented to the
trier of fact.
The procedure employed in the instant case is appropriate to raise an
entrapment issue for appellate review. This is due to the unique procedural aspects
of the Utah statue.

If this court feels that the procedure that was employed is

improper with respect to the entrapment issue, the appropriate remedy is to remand
the case to the district court, allow appellant to withdraw his conditional guilty plea
and proceed to trial. This is because the procedure of entering a conditional pleas to
appeal a pretrial entrapment ruling has been allowed in the past, State v. Richardson.
P.2d

, 201 U.A.R. 40 (Utah App. 1992), and appellant should not be prejudiced

by a change in procedures.
POINT II
THE POLICE ACTIONS WERE OUTSIDE REASONABLE
BOUNDS REQUIRING A FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS
ENTRAPPED INTO POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
Appellee argues that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence
should be employed in the appellate review of a pretrial ruling on entrapment. In State

6

v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), the court described that the standard of
review and stated, if
reasonable minds acting fairly on the evidence should
necessarily have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
621 P.2d at 1240. In Kourbelas the court also stated that while in engaging in this
review the appellate court must give "...all proper deference to the rulings of the trial
court, and to the findings of the jury" Id. at 1240.
State v. Thurman. _ P . 2 d _ . 203 U.A.R. 18 (Utah 1992), involved a lengthy
discussion of the standard of appellate review for pretrial motions. The court held
that factual determinations must be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The
determination of how those facts are applicable to a legal standard is reviewed for
correctness. The clearly erroneous standard and the standard for review of jury
factual findings are essentially the same. Thurman does add the requirement that
pretrial legal rulings be reviewed for correctness. Such a two step procedure should
be applied in this case.
With respect to the entrapment determination, appellee argues that the Utah
appellate courts consistently do not overturn convictions based on entrapment issues
unless there are high pressure tactics or appeals to extreme vulnerability by police
agents. That standard has not been employed in the Utah courts. In fact, in State
v. UdelL supra, the court noted that in the appellate review of an entrapment issue
the court must determine whether the police conduct "... was within reasonable
bounds...." 728 P.2d at 133.

7

The case law dealing with what constitutes or does not constitute entrapment
was discussed at length in appellant's opening brief.9 In this case the critical facts
included: The development of a personalized relationship between appellant and
Burchette over a nine month period. That relationship was independent of drug sales
or drug use. There were sexual overtones to the relationship. Burchette believed that
she could offer sexual favors in exchange for drugs. The marijuana was sold to the
defendant by the agent. Burchette made requests to purchase drugs from appellant
and no such purchases were made. Finally, appellant lacked the financial resources
to complete the transaction.
The police actions in this case went beyond reasonable bounds. Burchette did
more than merely provide appellant with a opportunity to commit a crime. His criminal
involvement was induced by the actions of the undercover police officer.

The

appellant's judgement and conviction should be reversed. This court should order that
the charge against appellant be dismissed.
POINT III
THE ACTIONS OF THE POLICE OFFICERS IN THE INSTANT
CASE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
A. Federal Analysis.
The federal due process analysis was discussed in appellant's opening brief.10
The argument on that issue is submitted on that brief.

9

See point I of appellant's opening brief; (pp.11-16).

10

Brief of appellant at pp. 16-18.
8

B. State Analysis.
Appellee takes the position that a due process analysis for outrageous
governmental conduct has been addressed by the legislature in the entrapment
statute. 11 In making this argument appellee describes at length how appellant failed
to question the constitutionality of that statue. The issue raised by appellant is not
whether the entrapment statute violates due process. Rather, the issue is whether
the due process protections of Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution provide
greater or different protections than the entrapment statute or the federal due process
protections.
The entrapment statute requires a showing that a defendant was induced to
commit a criminal offense and that the defendant was not predisposed to commit that
offense. The due process analysis that appellant urges this court to adopt involves
a four part test that originated in People v. Isaacson. 378 N.E.2.d 78 (N.Y. App.
1978). The factors that the court require to be considered include:
(1) whether the police manufactured a crime which
otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely
involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity
[citations omitted]; (2) whether the police themselves
engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a
sense of justice [citations omitted]; (3) whether the
defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by
appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past
friendship, by temptation or exorbitant gain, or by
persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness [citations
omitted]; and (4) whether the record reveals simply a desire
to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police
motive is to prevent further crime or protect the populace.

11

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(1 )(1953 as amended).

378 N.E. 2.d at 83. The first and third factors descried in the Isaacson test are
covered in the Utah entrapment statute and its interpretive case law. The second and
fourth factors are not factors that would be considered in an entrapment analysis.
However, those factors are properly considered in determining if there has been a due
process violation.
The reasons why a state due process analysis that differs from the federal
analysis should be adopted were described in appellant's opening brief.12

Those

reasons were not contested by appellee. The application of the facts of this case to
the analysis from Isaacson was also covered in appellant's opening brief.13
analysis also was not challenged in appellee's brief.

That

Appellee does attempt to

distinguish the case at bar from the facts in State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062 (Utah
1988).

Colonnna is distinguishable, but for different reasons than were given by

appellee.
In Colonna the court declined to adopt the due process analysis described in
Isaacson. The defendant in Colonna was convicted of aggravated robbery. The
incident took place after an undercover narcotics agent met the defendant and others.
The agent provided drugs and alcohol then consumed them with the defendant.
Following a discussion about the victim the agent drove the defendant to the victim's
residence. At that residence the victim was beaten by both the defendant and the
agent. The victim's property was also taken. The court in Colonna did not adopt the

12

Appellant's opening brief at pp. 18-20.

13

Appellant's opening brief at pp. 23-24.
10

due process analysis from Colonna because the agent did not initiate the criminal
actions. The case at bar is distinguishable from Colonna. the agent did initiate the
criminal activity. She built a friendship with appellant over a nine month period that
was coupled with flirtations acts, sexual innuendos and sexual overtones. There was
no indication that appellant was engaged in any large scale drug sales or purchases
other than that initiated by the undercover agent. She requested that appellant sell
the drugs, which he did not do. Finally, she sold the marijuana to the appellant.
This court should adopt the

due process analysis from Isaacson as a

requirement of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. In doing so, this court
should enter a finding that the actions of the undercover agent in this case violated
Article I, Section 7. Based on that finding the charge of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute should be dismissed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
A. Harmless Error
Appellee first contends that any error in refusing to suppress the evidence
seized from appellant's residence was harmless.

When the claimed error is of

constitutional magnitude, it must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rose v.
Clark. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).

The only evidence that the substance seized from

appellant's residence was in fact marijuana was the test result on the substance.
Without further proof of the nature of the substance, the error in failing to grant the
suppression motion would not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
11

Appellee also contends that the question relating to the search of appellant's
workshop is moot. However, if this court orders that appellant may withdraw his
guilty plea and proceed to trial, the paraphernalia charge would be reinstated.
Furthermore, the scales seized from the workshop would be relevant to proof of the
element of intent to distribute. Consequently, the issue of the search of the workshop
is neither moot nor harmless error.
B. Search Incident to Arrest.
The first exception to the warrant requirement that appellee argues is that the
search of appellant's residence was incident to an arrest. The facts with respect to
this issue are uncontested. The seizure was made from a utility room in appellant's
residence some ten to fifteen feet from where appellant was located. That time
appellant was handcuffed and held at gunpoint.
Appellee relies on State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Aop.) cert, denied 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), to justify its claim that the seizure in this case was made from
an area within appellant's immediate control. Harrison involved an arrest in public.
That fact alone distinguishes Harrison from the instant case.

The defendant in

Harrison and his wife were walking their children at the time of his arrest. Both the
defendant and his wife were ordered to the ground by police officers. A search of a
diaper bag on the stroller that the defendant was pushing resulted in the discovery of
a handgun that was used in a homicide. At the time of the search the defendant was
detained in handcuffs about ten feet from the diaper bag. This court held that the bag

12

was sufficiently within the defendant's immediate control to constitute a search
incident to arrest.
As authority for the ruling in Harrison the court relied on several cases involving
searches of vehicles incident to an arrest. New York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
State v. Kent. 665 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1983); and In re. K.K.C, 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah
1981). The problem with relying that line of authority is that in Belton the court
established what it described as a "bright line" rule for the search of vehicles incident
to the arrest of a driver. In that situation, the Court held that an arrest of a driver of
a vehicle would enable police officers to search the passenger compartment without
regard to what area was actually within the defendant's immediate control.
The holding in Harrison that the search was properly done as incident to an
arrest was erroneous14.

A criticism of similar holdings on the issue of searches

incident to arrest has been made by Professor Wayne LeFave. He stated,
Most common, however is the tendency to view every
arrestee as a combination acrobat and Houdini who might
well free himself from his restraints and suddenly gain
access to some distant place.15
That same criticism is applicable to the position that appellee urges this court to take
with respect to the search conducted in the instant case.
Professor LeFave also felt that when a court addresses the search incident to
arrest exception to the warrant requirement:

14

The result in that case was not erroneous as the search was also justified as an
inventory search. 805 P.2d at 785.
15

LeFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3 (c) at p. 628 (West 1987).
13

.... the relevant facts are those which show (i) what places
it would be possible for the arrestee presently to reach, and
(ii), perhaps of somewhat lesser importance, how probable
it \s that the arrestee would undertake to seek means of
resistance or escape or to destroy evidence.[footnote
omitted, emphasis in the original.]16
Those were the facts addressed in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983). In that
case, the court held that marijuana plants were improperly seized from the defendant's
back yard subsequent to his arrest. The defendant was in custody and there was no
potential that the evidence could be concealed or destroyed.
For the appellant to have gained access to the marijuana that was seized in this
case, he would have had to slip out of the handcuffs, enter an adjoining room some
ten feet away, grab a package containing approximately one pound of vegetable
material and conceal or destroy its contents. This all would have to be done without
detection by the two officers who were holding the appellant at gunpoint.

The

combination acrobat and Houdini described by Professor LaFave could not have
accomplished those feats. The seizure of the evidence cannot be justified as a search
incident to arrest. The object of the search was not only out of appellant's immediate
control, but it would have been physically impossible for him to obtain control over
it.
The other reason that the search should not be justified as incident to arrest is
that it was not in fact made incident to an arrest. Upon entry into the house the
officers immediately asked Burchette where the marijuana was located. She pointed

Id at 629-630.
14

it out to them and it was seized. The officers were not removing objects from those
areas where appellant may obtain possession of them. The evidence seized as a
result of the warrantless search must be ordered suppressed.
C. Inevitable Discovery.
The other justification for the warrantless search argued by appellee is
inevitable discovery. Appellee contends that the officers arresting appellant would
have been entitled to make a "protective sweep" of the residence. The purpose of
such a sweep is to protect the safety of the officers who are effecting the arrest.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).

During such a sweep, it is argued, the

package containing the marijuana would have been discovered. The problems with
this argument are that it is not justified under the facts of this case and it was not
raised in the district court.
The cases where a protective sweep has been upheld involve situations where
the police were making an arrest or interviewing a suspect in a residence where they
did not know if others were present. In Maryland v. Buie. supra, the officers were
executing an arrest warrant for the defendant who was charged with armed robbery.
He was located in the basement of a house. The officers did not know if other people
were in the house or in the basement. The officers were concerned about their safety
while making the arrest. During a cursory search of the area, the officers observed
clothing that was worn during the robbery. The Supreme Court in Buie allowed
officers to make a search of areas adjoining the arrest from which an attack may be
launched. For a further sweep of a residence, the Court held that an articulable

15

suspicion that others were in the residence who may have endangered the officers is
necessary.
The Utah cases that have allowed protective sweeps both involved situations
where the officers entered residences not knowing who or what was inside. In State
v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), officers investigating a homicide followed tracks
in the snow from the scene of the crime to the defendant's residence. The officers
began to question the defendant. When the defendant requested to put on some
clothes the officers followed him into a bedroom where incriminating evidence was
observed. The court allowed the officers to accompany the defendant to the bedroom
to protect their own safety. Similarly, in State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987),
narcotics officers were making a drug purchase. They had followed the seller to the
location of his supplier. The seller was arrested and the officers went to the residence
where the supplier was located. The court held that exigent circumstances allowed
the officers to enter the supplier's residence. The court also allowed the officers to
conduct a cursory check of the residence to protect their own safety and to prevent
evidence from being destroyed or concealed.
In this case, Burchette testified that she knew that there were no others in
appellant's house.

The other agents involved in the arrest and search had held

surveillance on the house.

There was no indication that they had observed

automobiles or others at the residence that would cause them to have concern for
their safety. These facts distinguish the case at bar from Buie. Kellv. and Ashe. A
protective sweep cannot be justified where the officer where the officers had no

16

articulable facts that would lead to a belief that their lives or the lives of others may
be in danger. Furthermore, the officers should not be allowed to create a situation
which gives rise to an exigent circumstance requiring a protective sweep.17
Although the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Buie would allow officers to
look into areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest, such a search in this case
would be unreasonable. Neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ruled on
the issue of whether Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution allows
suspicionless searches or detentions.18 However, in the context of roadblock stops
several state courts have indicated that officers must have at least an articulable
suspicion before detaining vehicle.

Commonwealth v. Tarbert. 502 A.2d 221 (Pa.

Super, 1985), State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 (Ida.1988); £tat£
v. Bovanovskv. 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987) and State v. Parms, 523 So.
2d 1293 (La. 1988).
In the situation of a protective sweep, the officers should have a reasonable
belief based on a specific and articulable facts that the area to be searched harbors
an individual who poses a danger to the officer or others. In this case, there were no
facts to justify such a sweep. Burchette had been in the house for some time during
the transaction. She had no indication nor did the surveillance officers have any

17

See Point V. B. of Appellant's opening brief at pp. 28-33.

18

This state constitutional issue was not raised below because the state did not
argue the protective sweep issue in the district court.
17

indication that others may be in the house. Consequently, a protective sweep would
have been unreasonable under the facts of this case.
The second reason for rejecting this inevitable discovery-protective sweep
argument is that it was not raised by the state in the district court. A claim of error
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In State v Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132
(Utah 1989), the court held that the defendant's lack of standing to contest a search
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Likewise, in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d
656 (Utah 1985), the court held that he defendant could not contest the legality of
a search when the only issue raised in the district court was the legality of the initial
stop.
In the case at bar the questions of inevitable discovery and the need for a
protective sweep were not raised by the state in the district court. Legal and factual
arguments were not presented to the trial judge. Findings or conclusions were not
made by that judge.

The waiver doctrine applies to the state as well as the

defendant. Based on that doctrine, the inevitable discovery claim raised by appellee
must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's conviction for the offense of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute should be reversed. In addition to remanding this case to the
district court this court should order that the charge be dismissed because the
appellant was entrapped into committing the offense and because the undercover
officers actions violated appellant's right to due process of law. In the alternative, a

18

new trial be ordered and the evidence seized from appellant's residence should be
ordered suppressed.

DATED this

day of February, 1993.
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